

Sept 1 KAL

Sept. 26 1983 Petrov Mr. Volintsev court

Being about to be attacked

do it hard to find people who can be trusted
to really say an order (follow directions) that
will (if known) end life — in the SU
or clearly known

Europe

the US

(do it certainly if will
fulfill the expectation?

on earth?

no

12-13-15 }
1991
Why did Camp August 19-21 have to
fail?

What if?
(Port gone; Wall done)

| Did SU want Warsaw Pact
if it had never, Germany (NATO?)
did not?

from 1949 on / as earlier,
if we gave some
A-bombs: "closed"?
asked:

by both started with A+Bomb
Power?

Could it have been avoided?
faint talks?

no (?) SU want to join Germany?

Disband Germany?
(= Japan?)

12-15-15

12

CW Combine SU fear of Germany as alone
program:

armed, united: in hostile alliance,
choice not to be involved, occupied;
a loose Post, barrier: of SU-CP system

and European (NATO) fear of Germany
no-armed, united
distinct

choice not to be dominated,
or dropped into Germany
so as to deny (if choices?) not to
"allow" German arms, or central
(if the doubt about this?)
or 8?

OK? (if yes, OK -
After — us. MEX (local?)
us. (MEX - Owing, —
Rest?

→ II US DM, followed by SU DM (after C-II,
loss of K
(after loss of
VFR?)

US CW/NATO Policy: "Russia out, US in, Germany down."

Again US FU about us. no-armed Soviets

See USSR: What if uprising (East Berlin, Hungary, Poland
Czech (over)

is fear of Post armed forces?

Do we feel to intervene?

If SU persons intervene force
into West? (Poss. in Poland ~ 1980.
But not 1981?

PDS

8AM
12-11-15 1

If Hitler had got 10 bombs
US none...

(if he had wanted to attack SU
until he had the
as early, Poland...

(Ruhland, Halbe, Rosenberg... opposed
Bismarck...

(Hitler opposed opposing vs. Stalin...
(Cuba

DRV/SUN

VR / Russia

US / SH (1991+)

on Conkey, more for:

If SU had bomb (not US)
~~should~~ US have informed?

If ~~the~~ SU had Super (not Teller-Ulam)
should US have got it?

If Super had proved feasible
and not introduced
with two more (change, expensive, heavy)
would GAC have approved it?

Are differences between Teller-Ulam
and "classical Super" all public now?
Basic designs?

12-9-15
I of FDR ^{careful} ~~had~~ ^{peer} ~~frustrated~~ ~~Attorney~~ -
what would be best done?

LIHOP?

if GWR " " "

?

LIHOP?

Ask: Did the domestic event?

Could with best examples bring to LIHOP?

What if either part accepted it?

P. 4. (Send carrier to intercept
more hatchlings ...)

What then? No pop. attack results?

Philly?

No US-pop. war?

Germany? Hitler declares?

(Get this definite on FDR not favoring

P. H. ?

What would LBJ have done if he did force:

Aug 2 attack? (cancel 34A?

of de Bato?

Aug. 4 "attack"

(didn't he? Was that a "surprise"?)

(after warning, 2nd attack,
carrier...)

12-15-15 (7)

It could have been worse.

1) We could have avoided (as in Heaven: when we had
monopoly; but we did

(3) ~~(4)~~
or gone on bid about perjury
when SU did, or R (e.g. 1995!)

in Berlin '48 and on
Korea '50-53

(We were after
so worried)

(4) ~~(3)~~

OR: Some SU or US beach right
have been rightly seen as Nith!

1983
1979

or even OBP '53

(say we had
N-bank; or
Chin...)

instead of threats (each case)

(2)
OR: Carried out all
threats

(not "unthinkable", taken
impossible)

In 1986, "nothing went wrong" (except Paton's
computer)

If Perrow had received NATO alert...

(It's true that if Stalin had believed what
Andropov believed about US — that ^{about Hitler} opponent was
(possibly) like Hitler — SU would have done
much better in 1941 (even without perestroika))

[If FOR... Pearl Harbor? If no P.H. — is better off world.]

x

What different expectations (desires?
role of behavior)
would have averted WWI?

WWII?

12-7-115

What if } the burial went ' by Andropov died — on Niger? Keldwater? LBJ!

Could Reagan have been as


crazy as Andropov⁵ thought he was?

or " " was?!

WERE SOUS / ANDROPOV CRAZY? "PARANOID"?

81- (HINKLEY?)
REAGAN IN 1986?

LBJ — MAY 1965?

What do we really
concern FOR 
could have done
about Berlin?

Differs from
Byrnes/Neuhof/hot?

(≠ Wallace)

Notes from talk with Dan, December 6, 2015

- 1983 war scare
- my thoughts; PD 59, winnable nuclear war (going back to Dan's 61 revision of SIOP)
- 83 crisis; comparative study of crises
- relevant aspects; construction of instability, incentives for preemption
- other aspects (some contradictory); decapitation
- crisis, nuclear freeze movement, Gorbachev, and Dan in Moscow (1990)
- his call for new initiatives
- why this?; because of its importance for now
- relevant sources; *Pallid Giant*

the following are quotes:

- from Fred Kaplan's (1983: 383-384) *The Wizards of Armageddon*:

...PD-59, signed by Jimmy Carter on July 25, 1980. It ordered options that were still more limited, a withheld reserve force that was slightly larger, a greater emphasis on using nuclear weapons to destroy conventional military targets, including targets that might be moving on the battlefield; and it planned more explicitly for the possibility of fighting a nuclear war over an extended period of time...Fundamentally, there was nothing new about PD-59. It was merely an elaboration of NSDM-242, which grew out of the Foster Panel, which was explicitly based on McNamara's SIOP-62, guidance of 1961-1962, which was modelled on a decade of analysis at RAND. The Nuclear Targeting Policy Review, which led to PD-59, was handled in part through the Pentagon's office of net assessment, still run by Andy Marshall. It was ultimately directed by a Pentagon analyst named Leon Sloss...."

- (356)

...Air Force thinking since the end of World War II...more toward thinking about how to use these weapons, how to *fight* with them, and how to use them *rationally*.

A small nucleus of Air Staff officers who shared this line of thinking banded together on a project called NU-OPTS, for Nuclear Options or Nuclear Operations.

[James Schlesinger]

(365) Ivan Selin...Alain Enthoven's deputy for strategic systems in the last years of the Lyndon Johnson Administration...

[completes NSSM No. 3 in 1969, which imagines] "steps in an escalating crisis in which both sides want to avoid attacking cities," ; (366) [damage limitation, etc]; "If the language sounded familiar...it was no coincidence. Selin and his aides had thoroughly studied McNamara's SIOP-63 guidance and were seeking to apply its basic principles to contemporary conditions...."

(369) "Foster Panel...essentially a mixture of counterforce/no cities and NU-OPTS...."

NSDM-242 "fair reflection of the work by the Foster Panel." (369-370)

- (387) 1982 Top Secret Defense Guidance: US to have nuclear forces that could "prevail...force the Soviet Union to seek earliest termination of hostilities on terms favorable to the United States"—in short, to fight and win a protracted nuclear war. Lying at the heart of this guidance was the old "coercive strategy"; hurt the enemy and make him quit by threatening to hurt him more with a durable reserve force held squarely at bay.
 - This was no mere coincidence. The chief authors of this document were Andrew Marshall...Fred Ikle...and Richard Perle," mentee of Wohlsteter.
 - To look up; range of cruise? Capable of hitting Moscow?
 - Find out where Sloss says he went back to Dan's guidance (I thought this was in *Wizards of Armageddon*); but maybe Des Ball instead.
 - Henry Sokolski (Getting Mad?)
 - (perhaps it's a little more convoluted, where the various studies trace back to this, as indicated by Kaplan).

